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The 1986 Social Security Act introduced far-reaching changes to the supplementary pension
environment in Britain, encouraging the growth of defined contribution pension plans and
especially personal pensions. This paper examines the pattern of supplementary pension coverage
of employees in Britain five years after the implementation of the Act, using cross-sectional data
from the Family Resources Survey 1993–94. Two-thirds of employees in Britain are covered by
private contracted-out pension schemes. Employer-provided defined benefit pension schemes
remain the dominant type of supplementary pension scheme. The growth of personal pension plans
is more marked among manual, less-skilled, workers in smaller establishments. The paper
concludes that, in the absence of further pension reform, adverse labour market conditions will
exert downward pressure on private pension coverage.
JEL classification: I38, J32, J38.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1986 Social Security Act introduced far-reaching reforms to supplementary
pension provision in Britain, precipitating important changes in the pattern of
supplementary pension coverage. The Act aimed to scale down the state
supplementary pension commitments and to encourage private pension
provision. The reforms were expected to produce a ‘push’ and a ‘pull’ effect
favouring private provision. The Act reduced the entitlements for members of
the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), pushing members towards
private alternatives. At the same time, it enhanced the attractiveness of private
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alternatives by extending tax-privileged status to personal pensions (appropriate
personal pensions, or APPs) and occupational defined contribution schemes
(contracted-out money-purchase schemes, or COMPs). Prior to the Act, tax-
privileged status was restricted to defined benefit occupational schemes
(contracted-out salary-related schemes, or COSRs). Additional financial
incentives and high-profile marketing facilitated transfers from SERPS to private
pension schemes. The Act also altered the balance within private pension
provision by making occupational pension membership voluntary. These
measures were intended to create a level playing field for private provision,
which was expected to encourage competition and product innovation and to
lead to the expansion of supplementary pension coverage. What is the resulting
pattern of supplementary pension coverage? Lack of relevant data has precluded
a detailed examination of this question so far. This paper aims to fill this gap, by
examining the pattern of supplementary pension coverage of employees in
Britain five years after the implementation of the reforms using cross-sectional
data from the 1993–94 Family Resources Survey.
Examination of the pattern of supplementary pension coverage is important
because it helps to evaluate the effectiveness and limitations of the reforms. An
important consideration in the reforms introduced by the 1986 Social Security
Act had to do with the impact of pension arrangements on the labour market.
Government and business organisations have, for some time now, stressed the
need to improve the flexibility of the labour market, and the changes proposed
were expected to contribute to this objective. In particular, the enhancement of
defined contribution pension schemes, and especially personal pension plans,
was premised on the view that these had design features that created fewer
constraints for employers’ manpower and pay policies, and for employees’
pension preferences, than final salary occupational pension schemes. In addition,
it was expected that APPs would prove especially attractive to employees in
small firms, to those in non-standard employment and to the self-employed, all
groups for whom final salary schemes are ill suited. COMPs and APPs could
therefore be expected to enhance labour market flexibility while at the same time
expanding supplementary pension coverage and reducing future state pension
liabilities.
Whether supplementary pension coverage has moved in line with these
expectations is important for the continuing debate over proposals for future
reform of pension provision, especially as the future growth of private pension
provision is a key element in this debate (Johnson, 1996; Retirement Income
Inquiry, 1996; Department of Social Security, 1997). The rapid growth of APPs
surpassed government expectations, exposing regulatory weaknesses and
concerns about the adequacy of the benefits they will provide. There is concern
over the impact of regulatory changes that will follow the implementation of the
1995 Pensions Act, and there is continued concern over the need to adjust
supplementary pension provision to accommodate changes in labour marketSupplementary Pension Coverage in Britain
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conditions. Examining the determinants of supplementary pension provision will
help identify the prospects for growth in private pension coverage.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews
comparative properties of plan design features and identifies four main types of
pension schemes in Britain. Section III provides descriptive statistics on pension
scheme membership and reports on the results from the estimation of models of
supplementary pension scheme take-up. Section IV discusses the prospects for
growth in private pension coverage in Britain. The final section concludes.
II. MAIN TYPES OF SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION PLANS IN BRITAIN
There are a wide variety of supplementary pension plans in Britain (Daykin,
1994; Dilnot, Disney, Johnson and Whitehouse, 1994; Government Actuary,
1994; Blake, 1995), with different contribution, funding and benefit rules. The
main types of pension plans can be identified with reference to the interplay of
three key characteristics: whether provision is public or private; the contribution
and entitlement structure; and the role of employers in organising pension plans.
1. Public vs. Private Supplementary Pension Plans: Contracting Out
In Britain’s pension system, membership of SERPS is the default for all workers
earning above the National Insurance (NI) lower earnings limit (LEL).
1 Workers
can opt to belong to a private supplementary pension plan and, provided the plan
satisfies minimum standards, a fraction of a worker’s NI contributions are
transferred to the private plan.
2 Workers in this situation are said to contract out
of SERPS into a private plan. The 1986 Act extended this contracting-out facility
to COMPs and APPs. In order to encourage SERPS members to transfer to a
private pension plan, the NI contribution rebate was temporarily raised.
3 There
are a large number of private pension plans that are not contracted out of
SERPS.
4 These may be pension plans providing benefits additional to those
provided by SERPS or the main private plans; or selective pension schemes for
highly-paid workers.
2. Defined Benefit vs. Defined Contribution Pension Plans
For analytical purposes, a distinction can be made between defined contribution
and defined benefit pension schemes. In defined benefit pension plans, the
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participant is assured of a benefit calculated using a measure of final salary and
years of service, and the employee and/or employer contributions vary to achieve
this level of benefit. In defined contribution pension schemes, the level of
contributions is set, and the pension benefit depends solely on the contributions
and returns accumulated at retirement.
There is an important body of literature that examines the generic properties
of these two types of pension plans (Dorsey, 1987; Bodie, Marcus and Merton,
1988; Bodie, 1990; Brugiavini, Disney and Whitehouse, 1993). Defined benefit
plans have design properties that can be shown to be useful as a productivity-
enhancing device in the context of a firm’s human resource policy (Ippolito,
1987; Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier, 1994). Defined benefit plans typically
sort stayers from quitters, and help match stayers to long-tenure firms (Ippolito,
1994). They strengthen worker–firm attachment, enabling investment in firm-
specific skills. They reward, through pay-backloading, high achievers at, ceteris
paribus, zero net payroll cost to the firm (Lazear, 1985; Ippolito, 1991). They
also help ensure productivity as workers near retirement (Lazear, 1981; Lazear,
1990). Defined benefit plans can have utility-enhancing properties for workers
who are otherwise constrained in their efforts to smooth consumption over the
life cycle or who have low intertemporal discount rates, are job-uncertainty
averse or have preferences for rising age–earnings profiles (Loewenstein and
Sicherman, 1991; Frank and Hutchens, 1993).
Defined benefit plans also introduce constraints for employers and
employees. They require long-term contracts, which firms must fulfil in order to
sustain their reputation. From the employer’s perspective, they require fixed
minimum hours, otherwise workers would wish to work longer hours late in their
tenure and shorter hours earlier (Lazear, 1985). They require a normal retirement
age, as otherwise workers would wish to (over)extend their tenure (Lazear,
1983). They also introduce constraints upon the demographic composition of a
firm’s work-force, in that they require, for funding purposes, a balance of
contributors and beneficiaries (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1989). For employees,
membership of a defined benefit plan restricts mobility as job transfers are
subject to significant penalties (Dorsey, 1995), restricts hours flexibility and
penalises inactivity spells.
Defined contribution plans, on the other hand, have few of the intrinsic
productivity-enhancing properties of defined benefit plans. A generic defined
contribution plan is fully portable, so that the productivity-enhancing properties
connected to long, and certain, tenure are not present. At its most basic, a
defined contribution pension plan is a tax-privileged savings plan.
Discussion of comparative properties of generic defined benefit vs. defined
contribution pension plans is useful, but it can be overstated. First, it inevitably
glosses over the complexity and detail of specific pension plans. As Disney
(1995) points out, it is possible to design defined benefit plans and defined
contribution plans that are largely indistinguishable in the structure of theSupplementary Pension Coverage in Britain
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contributions and benefits they produce, and presumably in the pattern of
incentives they generate. Second, it has not been easy to verify empirically the
direction and strength of the differential incentives of defined contribution and
defined benefit plans (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1993). Third, it is even harder to
verify that the adoption of defined benefit plans formed part of a distinctive
strategy by employers, or that, more recently, the adoption of defined
contribution pension plans is a signal that employers are abandoning original
human resource values (Green, 1982; Kruse, 1991; Ghilarducci, 1992).
3. Employer-Provided vs. Personal Pension Plans
Occupational pension plans were the dominant form of supplementary pension
provision in Britain until the recent reform. Employer provision of pension plans
can exploit economies of scale in pension plan costs and access to financial
markets, and better information on employee risks (Gustman, Mitchell and
Steinmeier, 1994). Recently, employers have become more reticent in taking up
responsibility for employees’ pension arrangements. Attitudinal surveys of
employers as well as pension plan statistics have shown a significant retreat from
defined benefit pension scheme provision (Association of Consulting Actuaries,
1996; Disney and Stears, 1996). There are a number of reasons explaining this
change. These include the rising cost of defined benefit pension plans partly
brought about by regulatory changes, changes in the labour market and changes
in the employment relationship, and a possible shortening in the life of products
and firms. In Britain, this retreat from defined benefit pension scheme provision
has been facilitated by recent legislation reforming supplementary pension
provision.
With COMPs, the employer typically selects a pension provider and a plan
design, collects the NI contracted-out rebate together with any extra
contributions from employees and deposits them into the scheme’s fund. An
individual employee’s portion of the fund can be separately identified. At
retirement, the worker uses the accumulated contributions and returns to
purchase an annuity. The alternative is for employers to leave pension
arrangements entirely to the employees themselves through a personal pension.
An employer can organise a group personal pension plan, but this is simply a
collection of individual APPs placed with one provider. APPs are, in the main,
organised by employees independently of their employers. Employees select the
pension provider and the plan design. Those with contracted-out personal
pensions continue to pay the normal level of NI contributions and the
Department of Social Security credits the contracted-out rebate annually in
arrears to the pension provider of the employee’s choice.
Distinguishing between pension plans along these three dimensions yields
four broad categories of pension schemes: SERPS; contracted-out salary-relatedFiscal Studies
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schemes (COSRs); contracted-out money-purchase schemes (COMPs); and
personal pension plans (APPs). SERPS is the only state-provided supplementary
pension scheme and it is the default scheme for workers earning above the LEL
who have not contracted out to a private supplementary pension. Of the private
pension schemes, COMPs and APPs are of a defined contribution type, while
both COMPs and COSRs are employer-provided. The next section analyses
membership across pension plans in Britain.
III. DETERMINANTS OF PENSION SCHEME MEMBERSHIP
1. Pension Plan Membership Identification and Data
The data used are from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) 1993–94. The
survey covers a representative sample of households in Great Britain and its
primary aim is to assist the Department of Social Security’s forecasting of
benefit expenditure and policy design and evaluation. The 1993–94 FRS
collected interviews from 26,253 households from April 1993 to March 1994.
5
The FRS data have the advantage of providing information on affiliation to a
wider range of pension schemes than alternative household surveys in Britain. In
common with other pension data collected from individuals’ responses, FRS data
are affected by inaccuracies arising from respondents’ imperfect knowledge of
pension arrangements.
A working data file was constructed including respondents aged 15 to 65 and
excluding those inactive, unemployed or self-employed. Of the broad pension
plan types identified in the last section, members of COMPs, COSRs and APPs
could be directly identified from the responses to dedicated questions. However,
some adjustments were made where incomplete or inaccurate responses
appeared likely. Those who reported having a personal pension and being in an
employer scheme were assumed to have the latter as their main pension scheme.
Those who did not report participating in an employer pension scheme but
reported having payroll deductions for a pension scheme were assumed to belong
to COSRs. The residual were allocated to either a SERPS group or a no-pension-
scheme (Nopension) group according to whether they reported NI contributions
above the LEL.
2. Descriptive Statistics of Pension Scheme Membership
Table 1 shows the sample means of the independent variables across the
different pension scheme types. It shows the memberships of the pension plan
types to be well differentiated along a number of characteristics. Just under two-
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thirds of the sample are covered by a private pension scheme. Employer-
provided pension plans cover 42.6 per cent of employees.
TABLE 1
Sample Means of Variables across Pension Schemes
COSRs COMPs APPs SERPS Nopension All
Age 40.160 38.761 37.270 35.674 37.729 38.000
(10.40) (11.14) (10.62) (12.57) (12.36) (11.47)
Female 0.391 0.398 0.385 0.578 0.873 0.487
Married 0.787 0.765 0.747 0.648 0.711 0.731
Number of children 0.694 0.623 0.652 0.589 0.945 0.674
under age 16 (0.96) (0.96) (0.93) (0.96) (1.09) (0.97)
Children aged 0–4 0.211 0.202 0.218 0.171 0.241 0.204
(0.50) (0.49) (0.51) (0.46) (0.53) (0.50)
Children aged 5–10 0.248 0.217 0.229 0.225 0.397 0.249
(0.57) (0.52) (0.55) (0.55) (0.68) (0.57)
Children aged 11–15 0.236 0.203 0.205 0.193 0.306 0.222
(0.54) (0.50) (0.52) (0.50) (0.60) (0.53)
Children aged 16–18 0.084 0.067 0.065 0.062 0.081 0.073
(0.29) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.28)
Partner in private 0.414 0.379 0.420 0.310 0.438 0.386
pension scheme
Partner in SERPS 0.124 0.142 0.112 0.144 0.107 0.127
Terminal age of 0.239 0.311 0.247 0.284 0.396 0.272
education <= 15
Terminal age of 0.408 0.458 0.490 0.495 0.467 0.458
education 16–17
Terminal age of 0.164 0.125 0.141 0.135 0.090 0.142
education 18–20
Terminal age of 0.189 0.105 0.122 0.086 0.047 0.128
education 21+
Years of part-time work 1.508 1.952 1.844 2.993 6.374 2.467
(28.39) (26.52) (15.78) (88.60) (226.54) (5.07)
Years of full-time work 19.703 18.134 16.878 12.874 8.821 16.116
(32.89) (28.95) (24.34) (90.04) (228.41) (11.59)




COSRs COMPs APPs SERPS Nopension All
Professional 0.077 0.051 0.058 0.027 0.008 0.051
Managerial 0.378 0.300 0.309 0.194 0.070 0.279
Other non-manual 0.260 0.228 0.208 0.303 0.334 0.266
Skilled 0.165 0.245 0.259 0.204 0.107 0.195
Semi-skilled 0.088 0.144 0.129 0.202 0.281 0.150
Unskilled 0.019 0.028 0.034 0.061 0.196 0.051
Establishment size 0.173 0.249 0.368 0.388 0.589 0.316
1–24
Establishment size 0.243 0.254 0.256 0.265 0.202 0.248
25–99
Establishment size 0.275 0.274 0.200 0.194 0.087 0.220
100–499
Establishment size 0.280 0.190 0.124 0.114 0.035 0.173
500+
Part-time 0.009 0.020 0.035 0.047 0.578 0.078
Health insurance 0.099 0.114 0.079 0.037 0.005 0.070
Shares or share options 0.096 0.065 0.034 0.018 0.004 0.051
Weekly overtime hours 1.830 2.449 2.400 1.882 0.444 1.877
(5.07) (5.52) (5.51) (4.92) (2.24) (4.99)
Weekly hours 37.659 37.687 37.236 33.967 15.251 34.496
(8.85) (10.06) (10.68) (11.37) (11.20) (12.06)
Family credit 0.006 0.012 0.015 0.034 0.051 0.020
Gross weekly pay 340.913 286.755 278.453 186.601 46.397 254.430
(219.99) (185.43) (226.51) (164.02) (48.52) (214.24)
Marginal income tax rate 26.310 25.031 24.347 22.469 2.046 22.532
(5.49) (6.20) (7.21) (6.69) (6.57) (9.21)
Number in sample 7,600 1,476 4,340 5,956 1,948 21,320
(%) 35.7 6.9 20.4 27.9 9.1 100
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Source: Family Resources Survey, 1993–94.Supplementary Pension Coverage in Britain
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There are clear differences in the characteristics of the employees who are
members of the pension scheme types identified. Not surprisingly, the employees
in the Nopension group are predominantly female, low-skilled, early school-
leavers and part-timers in small establishments. SERPS includes a high
proportion of both younger and older workers, early school-leavers and people
with lower levels of skill and experience than workers in the private pension
schemes. The differences among private pension schemes are less marked than
the differences existing between private pension scheme groups and the others.
Members of the COSRs group tend to show greater education and experience,
have higher levels of skill, work for large employers and receive higher pay. By
comparison, the COMPs and APPs groups have a larger share of skilled manual
workers than the COSRs group. Compared with COMPs group members, a
higher proportion of APPs holders work in small establishments and in jobs
without employee health or financial benefits.
3. Multivariate Analysis of Determinants of Pension Plan Membership
In this section, the influences of individual, household, occupation and job
characteristics on pension scheme take-up are examined. This is done in two
steps: in a first step, the influence of these factors on contracting out is examined
by estimating a probit model, while, in a second step, the determinants of take-up
of the different contracted-out pension schemes are explored by estimating a
multinomial logit model. This approach can best accommodate the current
pattern of options and constraints applying to pension affiliation choices.
Workers who earn above the LEL are required to contribute to SERPS or,
alternatively, to contract out to an approved private pension scheme. For workers
who decide to contract out, the 1986 Social Security Act made all private
pension schemes voluntary, by withdrawing the right that employers had to
require workers to join their occupational scheme.
The Determinants of Contracting Out
What factors influence workers’ decisions to contract out of SERPS?
6 Some
answers to this question are sought by estimating a probit model. The results,
presented in Table 2, are largely as expected. Being female or having more
children reduces the probability of contracting out. Having a partner with a
private pension plan increases the probability of contracting out, but if the
partner is in SERPS this probability is reduced. Higher levels of education, skill
and experience all work to increase the probability of contracting out. Working
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TABLE 2
Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on the Probability of Contracting Out of
SERPs, Estimated from Probit Model
Dependent variable is whether employee has contracted out.
Sample includes only those with earnings above the LEL for NI contributions.
Control variables: terminal age of education 16–17; skilled; establishment size 100–499.
Variable Marginal effect t statistic Mean of X
Constant –0.819* –16.228
Age 0.037* 15.643 38.074
Age squared (×100) –0.050* –17.383 157869
Female –0.052* –5.591 0.448
Number of children –0.016* –3.879 0.649
Partner in private pension scheme 0.085* 10.636 0.382
Partner in SERPS –0.060* –5.760 0.129
Terminal age of education <=15 –0.053* –5.532 0.258
Terminal age of education 18–20 0.021* 1.988 0.147
Terminal age of education 21+ 0.028* 2.147 0.136
Years of part-time work 0.003* 2.468 2.072
Years of full-time work 0.010* 12.464 16.859
Professional 0.038** 1.911 0.055
Managerial 0.050* 4.507 0.300
Other non-manual 0.030* 2.810 0.259
Semi-skilled –0.047* –4.091 0.136
Unskilled –0.060* –3.288 0.036
Establishment size 1–24 –0.095* –10.583 0.288
Establishment size 25–99 –0.047* –5.052 0.253
Establishment size 500+ 0.057* 5.263 0.187
Part-time 0.030 1.309 0.027
Family credit –0.078* –3.189 0.017
Health insurance –0.021 –1.365 0.077
Shares or share options 0.163* 8.488 0.056
Weekly overtime hours –0.001 –1.532 2.022
Weekly hours 0.008* 7.167 36.448
Weekly hours squared (×100) –0.0095* –7.098 143433
Gross weekly pay 0.001* 21.234 275.769
Gross weekly pay squared ( ×100) –0.000012* –17.766 12158164




Mean of LHS = 0.694
Predicted LHS = 0.589
Pseudo R
2 = 0.5107
* indicates significance at 5 per cent. ** indicates significance at 10 per cent.Supplementary Pension Coverage in Britain
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in smaller establishments reduces the probability of contracting out, as does
being in receipt of family credit. Receiving financial rewards as a part of
compensation strongly raises the probability of contracting out.
Two of the reported marginal effects are out of line with expectations. First, it
is puzzling that the estimate attached to the marginal income tax variable
suggests that higher marginal income tax rates would reduce, albeit marginally,
the probability of contracting out.
7 Second, having worked further years in part-
time employment increases the probability of contracting out.
The Determinants of Affiliation to the Different Contracted-Out Pension
Schemes
A second step is to explore the determinants for contracted-out pension scheme
take-up. These are examined by estimating a multinomial logit model with three
options: COSRs, COMPs and APPs. This approach reflects the level-playing-
field private pension environment established by the 1986 Social Security Act,
but it raises a number of important issues. First, there is the issue of the length of
the adjustment period. It is likely that the behaviour of employers and employees
may show significant inertia in pension arrangements over a transitional period
after the legislation was implemented. However, the strong marketing of
personal pensions, and the stress given to choice over pension schemes in
government advertising, imply this transitional period was probably completed
by 1993.
8 Second, and perhaps most important, membership of occupational
pension schemes is mediated by employers’ decisions over whether to offer
pension plans. While employees working for employers offering pension plans
could not be forced to join them, employees working for employers who do not
offer pension plans have obviously no opportunity to join such plans. It is
therefore necessary to make the rather strong assumption that workers had, by
1993, sorted themselves into jobs with their preferred pension scheme status.
Third, there are issues related to accuracy of the survey responses regarding
pension affiliation.
9,10 In the light of these issues, the results presented in Table 3
should be taken as provisional.
                                                                                                                                   
7The marginal income tax variable indicates the highest rate of income tax applicable to gross earnings net of
personal allowances plus one-half of the married couple’s allowance if relevant. Measurement error or
endogeneity may be responsible for the puzzling result on this variable.
8This is clear from attitudinal surveys (Williams and Field, 1993) showing that public perceptions over the
advantages and disadvantages of supplementary pension schemes were fully formed, and essentially correct, by
1992.
9The Pension Law Review Committee in 1992 commissioned research on employees’ knowledge of pension
arrangements. A sample of employees were asked whether they belonged to a final-salary or a money-purchase
occupational pension plan, and their responses were checked with employers’ records. Seventy-six per cent of
respondents accurately stated their pension scheme, but a further 12 per cent who reported belonging to a
money-purchase pension plan did in fact belong to a final-salary pension plan (Pension Law Review
Committee, 1993). The findings suggest that survey responses on pension plan affiliation are affected by theFiscal Studies
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The reported parameters from the multinomial logit enable an assessment of
the qualitative impact of different variables on private pension scheme
affiliation.
11 The salient points are discussed below.
As expected, age reduces the probability of affiliation to APPs or COMPs
relative to COSRs, but also the probability of affiliation to COMPs relative to
APPs. Being female reduces the probability of affiliation to a defined
contribution pension scheme relative to COSRs, but has no significant effects on
the choice of defined contribution pension scheme. Leaving full-time education
at a later age reduces the probability of belonging to APPs or COMPs relative to
COSRs.
Having spent longer in part-time work increases the probability of holding
APPs relative to employer-provided pensions. This is echoed by the parameter
associated with whether workers are currently working part-time. The
occupational dummies suggest that working in manual occupations reduces the
chances of belonging to a defined benefit pension scheme. The differential
impact of occupational affiliation on the choice of defined contribution pension
scheme is significant only for professional and unskilled workers, who are more
likely to hold APPs than COMPs.
The size of establishment is important to whether or not workers are in
employer-provided pension schemes, with workers in smaller establishments
having a higher probability of holding APPs than employer-provided pensions.
The differences in probability of affiliation within employer-provided pension
schemes are significant only for large establishments, where COMPs affiliation
is less likely. Receipts of financial rewards and state benefits are also associated
with the probabilities of holding different types of pension.
                                                                                                                                   
respondents’ deficient knowledge of pension arrangements, and confirm findings of similar studies for other
countries (Mitchell, 1988).
10There is also an issue concerning the choice of statistical model. The multinomial logit model requires strong
assumptions about the distribution of the error term, particularly that the errors are independent across
categories. These are very restrictive and should be taken into account in the evaluation of the results below.
Alternative models were tried and found to be much less informative. The selected nature of the subsample
used for the estimation could be problematic for interpretation of results if unobserved influences on the
contracting-out decision also affect choice of scheme.
11The reported parameters show the log of the odds of a person with the relevant characteristics being found in
the selected pension plan type as opposed to the base plan type. For example, the estimated parameter for a
worker in a small establishment (size 1–24) being found in APPs instead of COSRs is 0.8837, which yields a
value of 2.41 when exponentiated. This can be interpreted as indicating that the odds for a worker in a small
establishment being found in APPs instead of COSRs is 2.4 times that of a worker in a medium-sized
establishment (100–499).Supplementary Pension Coverage in Britain
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TABLE 3
Estimated Parameters from Multinomial Logit Model of Private Pension Scheme
Affiliation
Dependent variable is whether employee belongs to APPs, COMPs or COSRs.
Sample includes only contracted-out employees.








Constant 1.9609* 0.6470 –1.3139*
Age –0.0399* –0.0601* –0.0203* 39.078
Age squared (×100) 0.0150 0.0725 0.0575 164033
Female –0.2344* –0.0820* 0.1524 0.390
Number of children –0.1151* –0.0760* 0.0391 0.673
Partner in private pension scheme 0.0525 –0.0807* –0.1333* 0.412
Partner in SERPS –0.0567 0.1404 0.1972 0.121
Terminal age of education <=15 0.0504 0.2850 0.2345 0.249
Terminal age of education 18–20 –0.2274* –0.3357* –0.1083* 0.152
Terminal age of education 21+ –0.4166* –0.6166* –0.2000* 0.158
Years of part-time work 0.0246* 0.0100 –0.0146* 1.665
Years of full-time work –0.0088** –0.0264* –0.0175* 18.615
Professional –0.1084 –0.2009* –0.0925* 0.067
Managerial –0.3084* –0.2674* 0.0411 0.346
Other non-manual –0.6965* –0.5243* 0.1723 0.239
Semi-skilled –0.0174 0.0711 0.0885 0.107
Unskilled 0.0453 –0.1375* –0.1828* 0.024
Establishment size 1–24 0.8837* 0.3292 –0.5546* 0.244
Establishment size 25–99 0.2669* 0.0713 –0.1956* 0.248
Establishment size 500+ –0.6050* –0.3642* 0.2409 0.219
Health insurance 0.2735* 0.6328 0.3593 0.094
Shares or share options –0.8396* –0.3374* 0.5022 0.072
Weekly overtime hours 0.0155* 0.0155 –0.00001* 2.084
Weekly hours –0.0113 –0.0074* 0.0039 37.527
Weekly hours squared (×100) 0.0236* 0.0022 –0.0007* 150078
Part-time 0.5137* 0.2443 –0.2694* 0.009
Family credit 0.8250* 0.5400 –0.2850* 0.018
Gross weekly pay –0.0017* –0.0016* 0.0001 314.868
Gross weekly pay squared (×100) 0.00005* 0.00004 –0.00001* 14785538
Marginal income tax rate –0.0112* 0.0004** 0.0115 25.538
n = 13402 LL = –11500.79 LL(0) = –12462.95
* indicates significance at 5 per cent. ** indicates significance at 10 per cent.Fiscal Studies
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IV. PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH IN CONTRACTED-OUT PRIVATE
PENSION COVERAGE
Extending private supplementary pension provision constituted a central
objective in the reform of pension provision in Britain. The findings reported
above on the determinants of contracting out and of private pension plan take-up
could help evaluate whether this objective is likely to be met.
1. The Impact of Pension Reform on the Pattern of Supplementary Pension
Affiliation
The pattern of private pension coverage that resulted from the reform is in line
with the predictions flowing from the pension economics literature, suggesting
that labour market, job and employment variables are paramount in explaining
supplementary pension plan affiliation. It is difficult not to conclude that some
shorthand measure of ‘job and worker quality’ could explain the largest part of
current supplementary pension plan affiliation in Britain. Affiliation to
contracted-out pension schemes is more likely for male, better-educated,
experienced and skilled workers in larger establishments.
These variables are also central to explaining the pattern of affiliation to the
different types of private pension schemes. The pension economics literature
suggests that employers are more likely to introduce defined benefit pension
plans for jobs in which longer tenure and skills acquisition are important, and in
which worker motivation is more effective than worker monitoring in raising
productivity. At the same time, risk-averse workers with a longer-term outlook
and stronger preference for raising age–earnings profiles are more likely to be
attracted to these jobs. Holders of defined contribution pension plans are more
likely to have left full-time education earlier than members of defined benefit
pension plans. They are also more likely to be found in small establishments and
in manual occupations, and to receive lower earnings and work more overtime,
than members of defined benefit pension plans.
A survey of pension provision among small firms indicates that a significant
and growing portion of employers are terminating their COSRs and replacing
them with COMPs, or are maintaining their COSRs for established workers and
offering only COMPs to new employees (Association of Consulting Actuaries,
1996). It can be hypothesised that the emerging pattern of supplementary
pension plan affiliation reflects strongly changes both in employment relations
and in the labour market in Britain.
12
                                                                                                                                   
12Other factors, such as the regulatory changes to COSRs, may also be at work. There is evidence that where
new occupational pension plans are set up, employers of both small and large firms are increasingly favouring
COMPs (Association of Consulting Actuaries, 1996; Disney and Stears, 1996).Supplementary Pension Coverage in Britain
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2. Labour Market Conditions and the Scope for Expanding Private Pension
Coverage
In this context, the 1986 Act’s enhancement of APPs and COMPs has been
partially successful in expanding private pension coverage among employees for
whom COSRs are unavailable or unattractive. The rapid growth in personal
pension take-up took many by surprise. The growth of COMPs has been less
dramatic by comparison. This ‘personal pension stampede’ was the result of an
important migration of workers from SERPs, and to a lesser extent from COSRs,
and ensured an initial rise in private pension coverage.
13 There are indications,
however, that the growth in APPs affiliation peaked in 1990–92, and both
personal pension and private pension coverage show a declining trend since.
14
The estimated determinants of supplementary pension affiliation above
suggest that structural changes in the labour market in Britain will continue to
generate pressures on supplementary private pension scheme coverage. Longer-
term labour market trends, such as the structural employment shift from industry
to services, the expansion of part-time employment and the increased labour
force participation of women, will exert downward pressure on private pension
plan coverage. Current labour market trends that operate to reduce the incidence
of stable, high-productivity, long-tenured jobs will further work to reduce private
pension coverage, and especially employer-provided pension plan coverage
(Disney and Stears, 1996).
15 There has been a steady decline in membership of
COSRs in Britain, and the introduction of stricter, and hence costlier, regulations
by the 1995 Pensions Act is likely to reinforce this trend. Similar trends have
been observed for the US (Parsons, 1991; Bloom and Freeman, 1992).
It has been suggested that the expansion of APPs and COMPs could
potentially counteract these adverse pressures on private pension coverage.
Although some measure of substitution of defined contribution pension plans for
defined benefit pension plans has been noted (Association of Consulting
Actuaries, 1996; Disney and Stears, 1996), the results of the multivariate
analysis above suggest there are definite limits to the extent to which APPs can
substitute for employer-provided pension plans. This is because of the
differences observed in the profiles of APPs and COMPs affiliates on the one
                                                                                                                                   
13As the focus here is coverage, I am leaving to one side the issue of whether APPs or COMPs are likely to
provide better or worse pension benefits than SERPS. Evaluating the overall impact of the reform would also
need to take account of ‘mis-selling’ of personal pensions.
14General Household Survey self-reported pension affiliation data show a decline in private pension coverage
from 71 per cent in 1992 to 66 per cent in 1996. Lifetime Labour Market Database records data show, for
employees above the LEL, a decline in private pension coverage from 57 per cent in 1993 to 53 per cent in
1996.
15The extent to which stable, long-tenured jobs have declined in Britain is disputed. A study of job tenure by
Burgess and Rees (1996) concludes that, although some reduction in tenure can be observed over the period,
the changes are marginal, while Gregg and Wadsworth (1995) argue forcibly that these changes are significant
for displaced workers or new entrants to the labour market.Fiscal Studies
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hand and COSRs affiliates on the other. Assuming constant pension environment
and worker and employer preferences, it is likely that APPs and COMPs could
substitute for COSRs in industrial, skilled manual employment,
16 but this is less
likely in skilled and non-manual jobs. Presumably these are jobs requiring
incentives to enhance worker attachment and productivity.
COMPs are perhaps a better substitute for COSRs than for APPs. At least as
far as small firms are concerned, evidence suggests that APPs are a less-
preferred alternative to COMPs (Association of Consulting Actuaries, 1996).
The expansion of COMPs coverage has been marginal, and this is to a large
extent explained by the differences in profile of their affiliates as compared with
COSRs members. The profile of COMPs holders is much closer to that of APPs
holders than to that of COSRs members. The rapid expansion of APPs coverage
has been checked. The rapid initial growth in APPs may have been inflated in
the late 1980s by inappropriate advice and by the opportunistic behaviour of
over-annuitised workers moving to APPs in order to trade off current for future
consumption (Disney and Stears, 1996).
17 The findings suggest that, in the
absence of further pension reform, the prospects for expansion of private pension
coverage are limited and that adverse labour market conditions are likely to exert
downward pressure on private pension coverage.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The 1986 Social Security Act introduced far-reaching changes to supplementary
pension provision in Britain, with significant implications for supplementary
pension coverage. By 1994, two-thirds of employees in Britain were covered by
a contracted-out private supplementary pension scheme, with one-fifth in
personal pension plans and the rest in employer-provided pension plans.
Analysis of the pattern of supplementary pension coverage, and of the
determinants of pension membership, shows there are clear differences existing
across workers in different pension schemes. These differences fit in broadly
with expectations of pension plan take-up suggested by the pension economics
literature. There is also a strong male bias in contracted-out private pension
coverage. The findings suggest that, in the absence of further pension reform, the
prospects for further expansion of contracted-out private pension take-up are
limited and that adverse labour market conditions will exert downward pressure
on private pension coverage.
                                                                                                                                   
16A proposal for industry-wide COMPs could strengthen coverage in these sectors (Johnson, Disney and Stears,
1996).
17Workers who were required by their pension scheme to make contributions over and above NI contributions
could reduce these to just NI contributions by transferring to APPs. Supposedly over-annuitised workers have
been observed to exploit pension reform or changes in pension regulation in other countries (Barrientos, 1996;
Samwick and Skinner, 1996).Supplementary Pension Coverage in Britain
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